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Attempts have been made to trace the origin of the trust to the
fideicomim'nssssm of Roman law,' the salman of medieval German law,2
and the Islamic wakf. It seems probable that ideas derived from all
of these devices have influenced the development of the trust. What is
certain is that the trust, and the power of appointment also, developed
from a medieval English device for holding land known as the use 4
Professor Maitland found evidence of conveyances to bishops to the use
of churches and monasteries as early as the first quarter of the ninth
century and conveyances to private persons to the use of members of
their families as early as the first quarter of the thirteenth,5 but the
use device only became common after the Franciscan Friars reached
England in 1224. Unlike the earlier Benedictine and Cistercian orders,
which had already secured ownership of large tracts of agricultural land,6
*© 1969, International Association of Legal Science. A modified version of
this paper will appear in Volume VI of the INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COM-
PARATIVE LAW.
**Professor of Law, University of Missouri.
1. II W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND, *328 [here-
inafter cited as BLACKSTONE]; K. DIGBY, INTRODUCTION TO THE HISTORY OF THE
LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 273-274 (3rd ed. 1884) [hereinafter cited as DIGBYJ; F.
SANDERS, ESSAY ON USES AND TRUSTS 1 (1792) [hereinafter cited as SANDERS]; Cf.
G. GILBERT, USES AND TRUSTS 3 (3rd ed. 1811).
2. IV W. HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW, 410412, n. 418 (1924)
[hereinafter cited as HoLDSwoRrn]; Holmes, Early English Equity, 1 L.Q.R. 162-174
at 163 (1885); Holmes, Law in Science and Science in Law, 12 HARv. L. REv. 443,
446 (1899).
3. Thomas, Note on the Origin of Uses and Trusts-WAQFS, 3 S.W.L.J.
162-166 (1949). In view of the known connection of the Franciscans with the de-
velopment of the use device, it should be recalled that St. Francis spent parts of
the years 1219 and 1220 in Islamic territory.
4. Ames, Origin of Uses and Trusts, 21 HARv. L. REV. 261 (1908); Brown,
Ecclesiastical Origin of the Use, 10 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 353 (1935).
5. Maitland, The Origin of Uses, 8 HARTv. L. REv. 127, 131-133 (1894);
II F. POLLOCK and F. MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THp TIME OF
EDWARD I 234, 235 (2d ed. 1898) [hereinafter cited as POLLOCK & MAITLAND].
6. The Cistercians, for example, reached England in 1127, built a hundred
monasteries in the century which followed, and added only one between 1227 and
the dissolution of the monasteries under Henry VIII. Butler, Encyclopaedia Britan-
nica (11th ed. 1910). It would seem from this that the order had acquired ample
land before the enactment of the Statute of Mortmain in 1279.
(39)
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the Franciscan Rule forbade acquisition of property by friaries subject
to it. The friars needed hospitals and poor houses for their ministry
to the poor, the sick and the aged in towns. They met their needs by
having land conveyed to municipal corporations to the use of their
friaries. 7 Other religious organizations adopted the use device after the
enactment in 1279 of a statute which provided for forfeiture to the overlord
of lands conveyed to religious corporations." Because the ordinary method
of conveying land was by feoffment, a person who conveyed land to uses
was known as the feoffor, the person to whom he conveyed as the feoffee
to uses, and a person for whose benefit the use was created as a cestui
que use.0 These correspond to the settlor, the trustee and the beneficiary
of modem trust terminology.' °
The meretricious hyperboles of the Preamble to the Statute of
Uses"1 and incautious remarks of legal writers who should have known
better12 have given rise to a misleading notion that the creation of
uses was regularly motivated by fraudulent purposes. This unfortunate.
legend may have contributed to the rejection of the trust device by
legal systems outside the ambit of Anglo-American law. The legend
sprang from the type of thinking which, under modem conditions, con-
fuses tax avoidance with tax evasion. Concealment of a taxable trans-
action by disguise is fraudulent; use of a different non-taxable transaction
7. F. MAITLAND, Egurr' (2d ed. 1936) 24-25; Brown, Maitland, POLLOCK
AND MAITLAND, Op. cit. supra notes 4, 5.
8. Statute of Mortmain, 7 Edw. I, stat. 2 (1279). It was possible to secure
exemption from the statute by means of a royal license in mortmain but this took
time and money. 27 Edw. I, stat. 2, § 1 (1299); 34 Edw. I, stat. 3 (1306) (consent
of mesne lord, if any, required); 18 Edw. 3, stat. 3, c. 3 (1344). The use device
protected the religious organization while negotiations for a license in mortmain
were proceeding. Barton, The Medieval Use, 81 L.Q.R. 562 at 565 (1965). After.
more than a century the penalty of the Statute of Mortmain was extended to con-
veyances to municipal corporations and conveyances to anyone to the use of relig-
ious persons. Stat. 15 Rich. 2, c. 5, §§ 4, 7 (1391). See 23 Hen. 8, c. 10 (1531).
9. DiGBY 276, note 1. It was usual to have multiple feoffees to uses, who held
as joint tenants, the survivors and survivor taking the whole when members of the
group died. By replacing members of the group as each died, the feudal dues to the
overlord which fell due when a sole proprietor died were avoided. IV HoLrswoRar
421-422 (1924); T. PLUCKNETr, CoNcIsE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 580 (5th
ed. 1956) [hereinafter cited as PLUCKNETr.
10. REsTATEmENT (SECOND) OF TRusTs § 8, comment b.; § 14, comment c.;
§ 200, comment b.
11. 27 Hen. 8, c. 10 (1535). The Preamble, for example, characterized wills
of land as an unmitigated evil. The falsity of this canard was soon demonstrated by
the enactment of legislation expressly authorizing wills of land. Statute of Wills,
32 Hen. 8, c. 1 (1540).
12. E.g., SANDERS 15-16.
[Vol. 34
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to avoid taxation is not fraud. In view of the long-believed legend that
the uses of uses were all fraudulent, it seems desirable to explain in some
detail why, by the fifteenth century, the greater part of the land in Eng-
land had been conveyed to uses.13
After the Norman Conquest of 1066 most of the land in England
was granted by William the Conqueror to earls and barons who, on
feudal principles, were bound to raise and command military forces of
the Kingdom and to act as members of the King's Great Council, con-
servators of the peace and civil judges.14 The rents and profits of the
lands so granted were intended as reimbursement of expenses and com-
pensation to the grantees as public officers. Thus the holding of high
public office and the holding of land by a tenant-in-chief of the Crown
were one and the same. These tenants-in-chief subinfeudated some of
their lands to under-tenants who were bound to assist their overlords
in the performance of their public duties and the under-tenants sub-
infeudated some of their holdings to working farmers. During the first
century after the conquest, however, the King's Court was chiefly con-
cerned with the rights and duties of the immediate tenants-in-chief of
the Crown, nearly all of whom held their lands as an incident of hold-
ing public office. During this century the tenure of public office and land
by such tenants-in-chief was precarious. They could be and sometimes
were deprived of office and land by the King. Upon the death of a
tenant-in-chief the King granted his office and land to whom he chose,
sometimes to a son of the deceased tenant, sometimes to a stranger.15
Such a tenant-in-chief held only a terminable life estate in the land which
could not be transferred and ceased at his death or earlier failure to
perform satisfactorily his public duties.
By the beginning of the thirteenth century it had become recog-
nized that, if land had been granted to a tenant "and his heirs," the
tenant held an estate in fee simple. The property passed at the tenant's
death to his heir, subject to payment of a sum of money, known as a
13. Chief Justice Frowike in Anon., Y.B. 15 Hen. 7, Mich., pl. 1 (C.P. 1499);
I E. COKE, INSTrrUTEs *27 2a [hereinafter cited as COKE].
14. G. BARRow, FEUDAL BRITAIN 42-43 (1956); I POLLOCK AND MAITLAND
230-231 (2d ed. 1898). English Feudalism differed from that on the Continent in
that under-tenants owed direct and primary loyalty to the King and were bound
to furnish troops and fight only in the King's wars. F. MArrLAND, CONSTITUTIONAL
HISTORY OF ENGLAND 161-164 (1908); D. STENTON, THE FIRST CENTURY OF ENG-
LISH FEUDALISM 1066-1166, 10, 13-14, 111-13 (1932).
15. G. ELLIS, EARLDOMS IN FEE 1-11 (1963); Thorne, EBnglish Feudalism and
Estates in Land, 1959 CAMB. L.J. 193-209, at 196-198..
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"relief," to the overlord. In the case of a tenant-in-chief of the Crown,
the estate was subject to the King's right of "primer seisin," which
was the right to receive a year's profits. 6 The King's Court, however,
still chiefly concerned with the estates of tenants-in-chief of the Crown,
defined the heir's right of inheritance in terms suitable only if land
ownership is equated with high public office. Upon the tenant's death
the estate passed as a unit to the eldest son or, if he was dead, to his
eldest son, to the complete exclusion of all other descendants of the
deceased tenant. If there were no descendants, parents and grandparents
were ineligible to succeed as heirs, as were brothers and sisters of the
half blood and all collateral relatives who were not of the blood of the
ancestor from whom the deceased tenant had acquired the land.'7 If
no relative eligible to succeed as heir existed, the estate passed by escheat
to the overlord. 18 Rural land could not be devised by will, so the tenant
was unable to avoid escheat by this means or to make provision for his
wife, his parents, or his daughters and younger sons.19 If the heir of a
tenant by military service was a minor, the overlord was entitled by
virtue of the feudal perquisites of wardship and marriage, to: (1) pos-
sess the land and the heir during his minority; (2) keep the rents and
profits which accrued during this period; and (3) control the marriage
of the heir, which meant, in practice, to demand a large sum for consent
to a suitable marriage.20
A statute enacted in 1290 prohibited further subinfeudations but
16. Assize of Northampton, c. 4 (1176); Magna Carta, 9 Hen. 3, c. 2 (1225).
The latter statute set the relief of an earl at £100, that of a baron at 100 marks
and that of a knight at 100 shillings. II BLACKSTONE '66. When a tenant-in-chief
had subinfeudated land to an undertenant, the undertenant was not deemed, for
this purpose, to become a tenant-in-chief if the original tenant-in-chief's estate
escheated to the King. Magna Carta, 9 Hen. 3, c. 31 (1225).
17. II BLACKSTONE *200-*240; II POLLOCK AND MAITLAND 260-313. The in-justice of this scheme of descent was greatly aggravated by its gradual extension
by the royal courts to estates of under-tenants, including the working farmers who
held by socage tenure and had never been public officers in any sense. II POLLOCK
AND MArILAND 260-313.
18. II BLACKSTONE *72-73, *245.
19. II POLLOCK AND MArrLAND 314-332; M. SHEEHAN, THE WILL IN MEDIEVAL
ENGLAND 266-281 (1963). Disposition of land by will was possible before the Nor-
man Conquest. Id. at 83-99. Land in towns held by burgage tenure was commonly
devisable by will after the conquest.
20. Magna Carta, 9 Hen. 3, cc. 3-6 (1225); II BLACKSTONE *67-71. Tenants
in socage, the normal tenure of free working farmers, whose feudal service was to
provide agricultural products rather than to perform military duties, were not sub-ject to these perquisites of wardship and marriage. Magna Carta, 9 Hen. 3, c. 27
(1225); II BLACKSTONE *88.
[Vol. 34
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permitted tenants in fee simple to convey their lands inter vivos by
way of substitution, that is, in such manner that the transferee became
an immediate tenant of the transferor's lord subject to the same feudal
obligations as the transferor 2 1 The power of a tenant in fee simple to
convey his estate was, however, hedged about by a number of severe.
restrictions which made it ineffective as a method of making family
settlements and wills. Apart from expensive judicial proceedings, the
only recognized method of transfer of a possessory estate in fee simple
was by feoffment with livery of seisin. This required both parties to
the transaction to go through a formal ceremony on the land, an incon-
venience if either was at a distance from the land or in poor health.22
From this requirement of present delivery of seisin or possession it followed
that a conveyance could not be made to take effect in the future: a
tenant in fee simple could not enfeoff his second son effective as of
the feoffor's death, the feoffor to retain possession until then. 23 In 1305,
it became possible for a tenant in fee simple to convey an estate in
remainder to become possessory in the future, provided he also conveyed
the present right to possession at the same time.2 Thus a tenant in fee
simple could enfeoff his brother for the life of the feoffor with remainder
in fee simple to the second son of the feoffor; but this would, of course,
deprive the feoffor of the enjoyment of the land for the rest of his life.
Moreover, the tenant could not provide in this manner for his afterborn
children. Fourteenth century authority indicated that remainders liiited
to unborn persons were void,25 and their effectiveness was highly doubt-
21. Statute of Westminster III, Quia Emptores Terrarum, 18 Edw. I, Stat.
1 (1290). Tenants-in-chief of the Crown were required to pay a fine amounting to
a third of a year's profits for the privilege of transferring their estates. 27 Edw. 1,
stat. 2, § 2 (1299); II BLACKSTONE *71-62, *89.
22. I COKE "49a; DIGBY 48; T. LrrrLnroN, TENURES § "70 (1481); W. SHEP-i
PARD, TOUCHSTONE OF CovMoN AssURANcEs *210. It became possible to perform
the ceremony by attorneys empowered by warrant to act for the parties. COKE,
s11pra; J. PERKINS, PROFITABLE BooKE § 210 (1642).
23. Hogg v. Cross, Cro. Eliz. 254, 78 Eng. Rep. 510 (1591); Barwick's Case,
5 Co. Rep. 93b, 77 Eng. Rep. 199 (1598); DiGnY 218-219. It would have been
possible to secure the desired result by making two conveyances. A, owning in fee
simple, could enfeoff B in fee simple. Then B could enfeoff A for life with remainder
in fee simple to the second son of A. This would, however, have involved payment
of two fines for alienation if A was a tenant-in-chief of the Crown. See note 21
supra. Moreover, the first feoffment would really be a feoffment to uses and B
could not be forced to make the second feoffment unless uses were enforceable in,
some manner. PLUcKNE-r 577-578; Barton, The Medieval Use, 81 L.Q.R. 562, 565-
566 (1965). .
24. Fitz William v. Anonymous, R.S.Y.B. 33 Edw. 1, 20 (1305).
25. Geffrey Fitz Osbern's Case, Y.B. 10 Edw. 3, Mich., pl. 8 (1336).
1969]
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ful in the fifteenth century.20 Even after their validity had been judicially
established in the sixteenth century,27 they were subject to destruction
by the holder of the preceding life estate for his own benefit.2 Perhaps
the severest restriction of all was that a tenant in fee simple could not
convey any interest in land whatever to his wife.29 Conversely, he could
not convey free of his wife's dower, which was a right to occupy, as
long as she survived him, a third of all lands which he had owned at
any time during the marriage.30
The statute of 1290 recognizing free inter vivos transfer of estates
in fee simple8l was also, in reality, a recognition of the fact that, during
the two centuries since the Norman Conquest, tenure of land had ceased
to be identical with tenure of public office and had become simply general
and beneficial ownership. The duties of military tenants to raise and
command military forces had been commuted into a tax payable in
money.32 The status of earls and barons as members of the King's Great
Council, soon to become the House of Lords, had ceased to have any
connection with tenure of land.33 Their functions as conservators of the
peace had passed to sheriffs and would soon pass to justices of the peace,
royal appointees whose offices were not related to land-holding.3 4 Vir-
tually all of their jurisdiction as civil judges had passed to royal courts
presided over by justices appointed by the King without reference to
tenure of land.35 Had the vigorous legislative leadership of King Edward
I continued for another generation it is probable that the glaring defi-
ciencies in land law which sprang from the now obsolete identification
of land tenure with tenure of public office would have been corrected
26. T. LrrnEToN, TENURES § 721 (1481); III HoL SwoaTI 134-136 (1923).
27. Butler v. Bray, 2 Dyer 189b at 190b, 73 Eng. Rep. 418 at 420 (1560);
Chudleigh's Case, 1 Co. Rep. 120a at 130a, 134b, 76 Eng. Rep. 270 at 296, 304(1589-95); Goodright v. Cornish, 1 Salk. 226, 91 Eng. Rep. 200 (1694).
28. Biggot v. Smyth, Cro. Car. 102, 79 Eng. Rep. 691 (1628); Thompson v.
Leach, 2 Ventris 198, 86 Eng. Rep. 391 (1690); Burnsall v. Davy, 1 Bos. & Pul.
215, 126 Eng. Rep. 867 (1798).
29. I COKE *112a; J. PEmINS, PROFrrABLE BooKE § 595 (1642). The scheme
of two conveyances suggested supra, note 23, could be used for this purpose but it
would have the same disadvantages.
30. Magna Carta, 9 Hen. 3, c. 7 (1225); I CoKE 30b-32a; J. PERKINS, PROF-
rrAI1LE BOOKE (1642) §§ 301, 319, 328, 329. This troublesome encumbrance could
have been justified in 1100 as a pension scheme for widows of public officers.
31. Statute of Westminster III, Quia Emptores Terrarum, 18 Edw. I, stat. 1
(1290).
32. I POLLOCK AND MAITLAND 266-275.
33. F. MAITLAND, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND 80-84 (1908).
34. Id. at 41, 206-209, 233-234.
35. Id. at 132-133, 204-205.
[Vol. 34
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by statute. But Edward's successors were either weak or interested in
other matters, such as foreign war. Statutory reform of the English land
law was not commenced until the sixteenth century or completed until
the twentieth.
In the meantime, landowners made feoffments to uses in order to
protect themselves and their families against the gross injustices of a
system of land law which was centuries out of date. They wanted to
make wills of land in order to make decent provision for their wives,
daughters and younger sons, and to prevent escheat when they were
survived by parents, half brothers and sisters, or uncles, aunts and cousins
not related to the ancestor from whom the land was descended. They
wanted to save their young orphan children from the gross abuses which
overlords made of the iniquitous perquisites of wardship and marriage.
These had become nothing but an unfair tax, payable only by those who
were least able to pay solely because they inherited lands during minority.
They wanted to be able to convey land free of dower and to provide
for their widows in some other way. They wanted to provide for efficient
and responsible management of lands of infants and persons absent on
crusade. These were not fraudulent purposes in any modern sense of the
term. Yet the curious paradox is that the eventual success of the use
device was probably due to its extensive utilization for another purpose
which may appear fraudulent to modem eyes.386 Until 1483, the only legis-
lative reaction to the mushrooming growth of the use device was a
series of statutes prohibiting its utilization for purposes contrary to
public policy, such as to defraud creditors.3' These statutes constituted
36. See text accompanying note 50 infra.
37. Frauds on creditors: 50 Edw. 3, c. 6 (1377); 2 Rich. 2, stat. 2, c. 3(1379); 11 Hen. 6, c. 5 (1433); 3 Hen. 7, c. 4 (1486) (trusts of chattels); 19
Hen. 7, c. 15 (1503). Evasion of the Statute of Mortmain: 15 Rich. 2, c. 5 (1391);
23 Hen. 8, c. 10 (1530). Obstruction of reversioner or remainderman's right to
possession: 1 Hen. 7, c. 1 (1485). Obstruction of adverse claims to tide: 1 Rich.
2, c. 9 (1377); 4 Hen. 4, c. 7 (1402); 11 Hen. 6, c. 3 (1433). It is interesting to
note that, whereas the statutes of 1377, 1379, 1402, and 1433 make the feoffment
to uses void, the statute of 1530 treats the feoffment as valid but makes the use
void, and those of 1392 and 1485 not only treat the feoffment as valid but make
the cestui que u se the legal owner of the land to the extent necessary to protect
persons injured by the transaction. This last approach, of treating the cestui que
-ase as the legal owner for limited purposes, was followed in 1 Rich. 3, c. 1 (1483),
which empowered the cestui que use to convey legal title without the joinder of
the feoffee to uses; 1 Rich. 3, c. 5 (1483), which conferred legal title on the cestui
when the then king was the feoffee to uses; 4 Hen. 7, c. 17 (1487), which gave the
lord the perquisites of relief and wardship when a cestui que itse of land held by
military tenure died intestate after Easter, 1490; and 19 Hen. 7, c. 15 (1503), which
19691
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a tacit legislative recognition of the propriety of feoffments to uses for
other purposes.
To understand the judicial reaction to feoffments to uses it is neces-
sary to know something of the English court structure of the period
when the problem arose. From a time before the Norman Conquest,
royal justice was sought by application to the Lord Chancellor, who
was the King's principal secretary of state and keeper of the Great Seal.
From 1238 to 1529 the Chancellor was usually a bishop and the King's
father confessor. After 1285 he was looked upon as the King's chief
minister. Until the twelfth century, disputes between tenants-in-chief
of the Crown were decided by the Curia Regis, over which the King
presided in person. This body sometimes consisted of only a small group
of great officers of state, later known as the Council, and sometimes
included a much larger assembly of earls and barons, which, in the thir-
teenth and fourteenth centuries, became the House of Lords, the upper
house of Parliament. During the latter half of the twelfth century, royal
justice was extended to most disputes over possession of land, even when
tenants-in-chief of the Crown were not involved. As a result of this
expansion of jurisdiction, with consequent increase in the volume of
litigation, the trial and decision of disputes over land came to be dele-
gated, by writs issued by the Chancellor under the Great Seal, to a Court
of Common Pleas composed of salaried royal judges selected from among
experienced practising lawyers.3 For a century the Chancellor exercised
a wide discretion in framing new writs to meet varied situations. That
discretion was greatly curtailed in the thirteenth century,39 as a result
of which any further substantial enlargement of the jurisdiction of the
Court of Common Pleas required legislation. The residual jurisdiction
of the Curia Regis or Council remained, however, and most of this was
gave the lord the perquisite of relief when a cestui que use of land by socage tenure
died intestate. It will be observed that the last two statutes preserve the effective-
ness of the will of a cestui que use for defeating feudal dues.
38. I HoLDswoRTH 34-56, 195-203, 252-253, 395-412 (1922); F. MAITLAND,
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND 133-135 (1908). The courts of King's Bench
and Exchequer, which later acquired concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of
Common Pleas over some types of land cases, applied the same common law and
used, in general, the same procedure.
39. II HOLDSWORTH 512-22 (1936); Provisions of Oxford (1258) (no new
writs without command of King and Council); Statute of Westminster II, 13
Edw. I, stat. 1, c. 24, § 2(4) (1285) (cases not within the general scope of existing
forms of writ to be referred to Parliament).
[Vol. 34
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delegated to the Chancellor, whose position as head of a distinct Court
of Chancery was recognized by statute in 1340.40
The Court of Common Pleas examined the contents of instruments
under seal,41 but other disputed matters of fact were referred by it
for decision to a jury, summoned by the sheriff, consisting of twelve
landowners of the county in which lay the land in dispute. Until the
sixteenth century the jury was required to decide such questions from
its own knowledge. The Court of Common Pleas would not permit the
receipt of testimony of the parties or other persons with knowledge of
the facts.4 The procedure of the Court of Common Pleas was adequate
to determine disputes over the contents of sealed instruments and such
notorious facts as feoffments and disseisins. As to little-known matters
like secret instructions given by a feoffor to his feoffees to uses it was
virtually useless. The Court of Chancery, however, like the ecclesiastical
courts, examined the parties and other witnesses under oath in order to
determine disputed questions of fact. 43
To the limited extent that its jurisdiction and procedure permitted,
the Court of Common Pleas recognized and enforced uses. Thus a cestui
que use was treated as a landowner for the purpose of qualifying for
jury service.44 Moreover, if a feoffment to uses was made on condition
that, if the feoffee failed to perform his fiduciary duties to the cestui
que use, the feoffor might enter the land and terminate the estate of
the feoffee to uses, the Court of Common Pleas would enforce the con-
40. 14 Ed. 3, stat. 1, c. 5 (1340); I HOLDSWORTH 401-409 (1922). At this
time the Chancellor was John De Stratford, Archbishop of Canterbury, Doctor of
Civil Law of Oxford University. His principal subordinates in the Chancery (e.g.
the Master of the Rolls) were, as was usual for several centuries, clergymen who
commonly had earned doctorates in civil law at English or French universities. E.
Foss, BIOGRAPHIA JURIDicA 636-638 (1870); B. WILKINSON, THE CHANCERY UNDER
EDWARD III 98-178, 199-203 (1929).
41. Cecily v. B., R.S.Y.B. 20 Edw. 1 258 (1292); IX HoLDswoRTH 164 (1926).
42. I HoLDswoRTH 275-284, 298-350 (1922); IX HoLDswoRTH 178-185, 193-
196 (1926); F. MAITLAND, CONSTrrunONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND (1908) 124-140,
211; II POLLOCK AND MArrLAND 622 (2d ed. 1898). Thus in Anonymous, R.S.Y.B.
20 Edw. 3, Mich., pl. 3 (II 168-170)(1346), Mr. Justice Sharshulle (soon to be-
come Lord Chief Justice of England) said: "It appears to us that in every case
in which enquiry is to be made as to the points of the writ by assize or by jury,
no proof by witnesses can be made any more than in an Assize of Novel
Disseisin***." The common law courts did not permit the parties and other in-
terested persons to testify until compelled to do so by statute in 1851. 14 & 15
Vict., c. 99, § 2 (1851).
43. V HoLDswoRTH 285-286 (1924); IX HoLDswoTH 340-341 (1926).
44. I CORE *272a-272b.
19691
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dition.4 Such a condition could be enforced, however, only by the feoffor
or his heir.46 As the commonest purpose of a feoffment to uses was to
cut off the heir in favor of a daughter or younger son, this type of en-
forcement would be worse than useless to the typical cestui qwe use
after the death of the feoffor. What the cestui que use needed was a
procedure by which he could sue to compel the feoffee to uses to do
his duty. This the Court of Common Pleas did not provide.47 It followed
that, if there was to be such a remedy, it would have to be provided by
the residual jurisdiction of the Council, exercised by or through the
Lord Chancellor.
In normal times feoffees to uses were trustworthy friends who did
their duty without compulsion. If normal peace and order had prevailed
in fifteenth century England there might never have been enough pressure
to prod the Chancellor into developing a remedy for the cestui que use.
But in October, 1386, a group of conspirators led by the uncle and
cousin of King Richard II secured control of Parliament and, by threat-
ening to depose him, coerced Richard into dismissing his Lord Chancellor.
The Great Seal was entrusted to one of the conspirators, and the King
was forced to approve its attachment to a charter which transferred
most of the powers of the Crown to the conspirators. The King soon
escaped from the conspirators and, with the aid of his dismissed Chan-
cellor, secured an opinion from the royal judges that the charter trans-
45. Pyper v. Geffreson, Y.B. 11 Rich. 2, Mich., no. 507 (1387) (Ames
Foundation Y.B. Series, V (118-119). In this case William atte Halle enfeoffed
three persons in fee simple on condition that they enfeoff the feoffor's wife, Mar-
garet, for life, with remainder in fee simple to the child of William with which
Margaret was then pregnant. The feoffor died and Margaret gave birth to Eliza-
beth. The feoffees enfeoffed Margaret for life with remainder in fee to Geffreson,
father of the defendant. Elizabeth entered and enfeoffed Aleynesson, who enfeoffed
the plaintiff. It is worthy of note that, in this case, the Court of Common Pleas
recognized the validity of a limitation of a future use to an unborn person. There
is no record of its recognizing the limitation of a legal contingent remainder in an
unborn person until 1430. As the condition was not broken until after Elizabeth's
birth, the problem of destructibility of equitable contingent remainders in unborn
persons was not raised. The fact that Elizabeth was en ventre sa mere when the
feoffment to uses was made weakens this case somewhat as- a demonstration of
the validity at common law of limitations of uses in unborn persons. Ames, The
Origin of Uses and Trusts, 21 HtAv. L. REv. 261-274 at 264 (1908); Barton, Tre
Medieval Use, 81 L.Q.R. 562-577 at 566-569 (1965).
46. Wroxham v. Andrew, Y.B. 10 Hen. 4, Mich., pl. 3 (1408).
47. Anonymous, Y.B. 4 Edw. 4, Pasch., pl. 9 (1464). Mr. Serjeant Catesby
(later a justice of the Court of Common Pleas) argued unsuccessfully that Chan-
cery law, which treated the cestul que use as owner, was the common law of the
land and should be applied in the Court of Common Pleas. DIGBY, 294-296 contains
a translation of the report.
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ferring the royal powers was void. The conspirators then regained control,
forced the dismissal of the judges, and prosecuted the former Chancellor
and judges before the House of Lords, charging that the giving of the
judicial opinion to the King was an act of treason. They were shrewd
in their choice of a forum because a trial in the ordinary courts might
well have resulted in an acquittal, it being hard to empanel a jury without
a single honest member. They acted less wisely in asking the new judges,
the serjeants of the common law and the advocates of the civil law,
to give an opinion as to the sufficiency of the charges. The judges and
lawyers returned a unanimous opinion that the charges were insufficient.
Despite this, the House of Lords, without hearing, sentenced the dis-
missed Chancellor and judges to be "drawn and hanged as traitors and
their heirs disinherited, lands and tenements, goods and chattels to be
forfeited to the king." The former Lord Chief Justice of England was
stripped and hanged stark -naked. The former Lord Chancellor and some
of the former judges escaped with their lives but their lands and goods
were forfeited in accordance with the sentence. 48 These incidents put every
landowner in England into frightful jeopardy. They had known, of
course, that treason entailed death and forfeiture, but not that loyal
service to the lawful king was treason. Worse was in store.
The disorder grew into a century-long contest for the throne among
various descendants of King Edward III. During this century there was
intermittent civil war, three kings were deposed and murdered, a fourth
was killed in battle, and treason prosecutions, with their concomitant
of forfeiture, multiplied.48 If a landowner supported either faction he was
likely to lose both head and land, because each faction was out of power
from time to time. If he supported neither he was almost certain to lose his
lands for failure to perform his feudal duties to the "true king," that is,
whatever faction was in power for the time being. It is no occasion for won-
der that most of the land in England was enfeoffed to uses in the hope of
avoiding forfeiture for "treason." 50 Nor is it surprising that feoffees to uses
48. I CoBBETr's STATE TRrALs 90-135 (1809); II HUME, HISTORY OF ENOLAND
8-11 (1828). Forfeiture of lands and goods for treason probably antedated the
Norman Conquest. By 25 Edw. 3, stat. 5, c. 2 (1350) it was provided that the
forfeiture of all lands for treason, including those of under-tenants, was to th6
Crown.
49. RowsE, BoswoRT FIELD (1963).
50. It was provided by 21 Rich. 2, c. 3 (1397) that forfeiture of lands for
treason involving compassing and purposing the death or deposition of the King
or raising men and horses to fight the King should extend to lands held as cestui
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who changed sides in the civil war failed to perform their fiduciary duties.
The result was tremendous pressure upon the Chancery to provide an ade-
quate remedy for the cestui que use. It did so.
In 1350 the King's Council examined a feoffee to uses with a view to
enforcing his duties under a feoffment to the use of the King.51 Because ex-
tant records of the Court of Chancery in the fourteenth and early fifteenth
centuries are scanty and rarely contain mention of the decision or decree, it is
difficult to establish the exact date when the Chancellor began to enforce
the fiduciary duties of feoffees to uses at suit of a cestwi que ase. There is
a record of a petition to the Chancellor made sometime between 1393 and
1399 which assumes his authority and willingness to compel a feoffee to uses
to convey land as directed by the will of the feoffor. 2 The records establish
that by 1459 the judges of the common law courts of King's Bench and
Common Pleas recognized the power of the Chancellor to compel feoffees to
uses to perform their fiduciary duties.53 It is evident that he had been exer-
cising this power for some time. After some hesitation, the Chancellor under-
took to enforce the use against the heir of the feoffee to uses5 and against
que use and as tenant in tail. This statute was, in effect, repealed by 1 Hen. 4,
c. 10 (1399). Lands held as cestui que use or as tenant in tail were not subject to
forfeiture for treason during the fifteenth century. I COKE *392b, III COKE "19.
Both were subjected to forfeiture for treason by 26 Hen. 8, c. 13, § 5 (1534).
51. In re Fabel's Uses, The King v. Blount, SELECT CASES BEFORE THE
KING's COUNcIL 1243-1482, 33 (Selden Society Vol. 35 for 1918) (1350). In this
case Gilbert Blount was sworn and testified that, shortly before his death, Thomas
Fabel, a tax collector indebted to the King in an amount over £400, delivered
goods and enfeoffed lands to Blount and five other men on condition that the
goods and lands be sold to the extent necessary to pay the debt and the proceeds
devoted to this purpose. Thus the feoffees to uses had a power of sale, upon the
exercise of which the interest of the King as cestui que -use would shift from the
land to the proceeds of sale. The idea of a trust under which the interests of both
the trustee and the beneficiary are property interests in a fund, the subject matter
of which changes from time to time, is not new.
52. Godwyne v. Profyt, SELECT CASES IN CHANCERY 48 (Selden Society Vol.
10 for 1896) (1399).
53. The Case of Sub Poena in the Chancery, SELECT CASES IN THE EXCHE4UER
CHAMBER 1377-1461 173 (Selden Society Vol. 51 for 1933) (1459); The Rights of
the Married Woman, SELECT CASES IN THE EXCHEQUER CHAMBER 1461-1509 12
(Selden Society Vol. 64 for 1945) (1467). While the development of a remedy for
enforcement of uses was proceeding the Chancellor often associated common law
judges with himself in the decision of cases and referred those of great difficulty to
all of the justices of the Courts of King's Bench and Common Pleas sitting together
in the Exchequer Chamber. Hemmant, Introduction to SELECT CASES IN THE Ex-
CHiQUER CHAMBER 1377-1461, supra, xxxvii, liv-lvii, lix-lxi, lxxvii-lxxviii. This being
so, the suggestion of some of the older writers that the enforcement of uses sprang
from the anxiety of the chancellors, usually bishops, to protect uses for religious
purposes created before 1391, is of doubtful soundness. E.g., SANDERS 15.
54. Anonymous, Keilway 42, 72 Eng. Rep. 200 (1502).
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persons to whom the feoffee conveyed the land, if they had notice of the
use or had not paid a valuable consideration.55 As the cestui que use was
nearly always in actual occupation of the land, it followed as a practical
matter that the feoffee to uses could not convey the land free of the use.
Unless the terms of the feoffment to uses provided otherwise, the feoffee to
uses, or whoever took title to the land from him subject to the use, owed
three duties to the cestui que use, the performance of which would be com-
pelled by the Chancellor: (1) to permit the cestui que use to occupy the
land and enjoy the rents and profits; (2) to defend the title in actions at
law by and against third parties; and (3) to convey the land as directed
by the cestui que ise.56
As holder of the legal title, the feoffee to uses was a feudal tenant hold-
ing of the feoffor's former lord. He, therefore, was responsible for the aids
payable to the lord when the lord's eldest son was knighted, his eldest daugh-
ter married, and his person required ransom. If a sole feoffee to uses died
without heirs, the land escheated to the lord, free of the use. If he died with
an heir of full age, relief and, if a tenant-in-chief, primer seisin, were due
the lord; if he died with a minor heir, the lord had the usual perquisites of
wardship and marriage; and, if he died survived by a widow, she was en-
titled to dower, free of the use. Escheat, relief, primer seisin, wardship,
marriage control, and dower could be avoided, however, by having numerous
feoffees to uses, who held as joint tenants. When one died the survivovrs
took the whole by right of survivorship and, when the group grew small,
new joint tenants could be added to it. Thus the feoffees to uses resembled
a perpetual corporation which never died. The cestui que use did not hold
as a feudal tenant of anyone. When he died no lord was entitled to escheat,
relief, primer seisin, wardship or marriage and his widow took no dower in
the use.57
The use device was intended to give the cestui que utse all the advan-
tages of full ownership of the land, less some of the burdens of ownership,
and with the additional power of devising his interest. In the enforcement
55. Anonymous, Y.B. 11 Edw. 4, Trin., pl. 13 (1471); Anonymous, Y.B. 14
Hen. 8, Mich., pl. 5 (1523); Abbot of Bury v. Bokenham, 1 Dyer 7b, 73 Eng. Rep.
19 (1536). In 1402, the House of Commons petitioned for the creation of a remedy
against persons to whom feoffees to uses wrongfully conveyed the land. The petition
was referred to the Council. Rot. Parl., iii, 511, quoted in PLUCKNETT at 578.
56. F. BACON, READING UPON THE STATUTE OF USES 10 (1804 ed.); F. HAR-
GRAVE and C. BUTtER, NOTES ON LORD COKE's FIRST INSTITUTE, Butler's Note 77,
V (11), to I CoK *191a (1812); Id., Butler's Note 231, II to I COKE *271b (1812)
[hereinafter cited as HARGRAVE AND BUTLER].
57. HARGRAVE AND BuTLER, op. cit. supra note 56; PLUCKNE'r 580-583.
19691
13
Fratcher: Fratcher: Uses of Uses
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1969
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
of uses the Chancellor, with the active collaboration and guidance of the
judges of the common law courts,58 brought this intention to full realization.
He enforced estates in uses, in fee simple, in fee tail, for life and for years,
which corresponded to the legal estates in land recognized by the common
law. 0 A cestui que use in fee simple could devise his use by will ° and trans-
fer it inter vivos without paying a fine and without the cumbersome feoff-
ment with livery of seisin.81 He could, moreover, limit a use to his wife, and
create estates in use to commence in the future, without a supporting par-
ticular estate. He could create estates in use which cut off a fee simple, and
uses in unborn persons that could not be destroyed by the living. None of
these things could be done at common law.62 For example, a feoffment could
be made to the use of the feoffor for life, remainder to the use of his wife
for life, remainder to the use of his second son in fee simple, but if the
second son should die without issue surviving him, to the use of the feoffor's
unborn third son in fee simple, and if no such third son should exist, to the
use of all the feoffor's daughters, whether or not born before the feoffment,
in fee simple.
If a feoffment was made in fee simple, without consideration and with-
out a declaration of the uses, the feoffee held to the use of the feoffor in fee
simple. 03 The feoffor could, either at the time of making the feoffment or
thereafter, inter vivos or by will, declare the uses to the feoffee. 64 Incident
to declaring the uses the feoffor could reserve a power to revoke uses so de-
clared and a power to declare new uses. For example, the feoffor might de-
58. See note 53 supra.
59. R. TURNER, THE EQurrY OF REDEMPTION 7-8 (1931).
60. Rothanhale v. Wychingham, 2 Cal. Proc. Ch. iii (1413-1422); Williamson
v. Cook, SELECT CASES IN CHANCERY, 115 (Selden Society Vol. 10 for 1896) (1417-
1424); F. BACON, READING UPON THE STATUTE OF UsEs 20-21 (1804 ed.); I COKE
"271b; HARGRAVE AND BUTLER, Note 138 to *111b; E. JENKS, SHORT HISTORY OF
ENGLISH LAW (1934 ed.) 104; F. SULLIVAN, HISTORICAL TREATISE ON THE FEUDAL
LAW 166-167 (1772); Stat. 4 Hen. 7, c. 4 (1487); 7 Hen. 7, c. 3 (1490); 3 Hen. 8,
c. 4 (1511).
61. F. BACON, READING UPON THE STATUTE OF USES 16 (1642); W. CRUISE,
ESSAY ON USES § 36 (1795); G. GILBERT, LAW OF USES AND TRUSTS 26 (2d ed.
1741); 0. W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 408 (1881); SANDERS 65.
62. Hopkins v. Hopkins, 1 Atk. 581, 590, 26 Eng. Rep. 365, 371 (1738); HAR-
GRAVE AND BUTLER, Note 231, III (2) to COKE I *271b; PLucNE'r 577; Fratcher,
Trustor as Sole Trustee and Only Ascertainable Benefidary, 47 MICH. L. REv. 907,
915 (1949).
63. Armstrong ex dem. Neve v. Wolsey, 2 Wils. K.B. 18, 95 Eng. Rep. 662(1755); II BLACKSTONE *296, *330; I COKE *271b; PERKINS, PROFITABLE BOOKE
§ 533 (1642); PLUCKNETr 580; W. SHEPPARD, TOUCHSTONE OF COMMON ASSURANCES
501-502, 512 (8th ed. 1826).
64. I COKE "271b.
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clare that the feoffment was to the use of the feoffor for life, remainder to
the use of the feoffor's wife for life, remainder to the feoffor's second son
in fee simple, reserving power in the feoffor to revoke the uses so declared
and appoint new uses. More commonly, the feoffor would simply declare
that the feoffment was to the use of the feoffor for life, remainder as he
should by will appoint.
Power to appoint uses could be conferred on others, whether or not they
held interests in the land. Thus a feoffor could declare that a feoffment was
to the use of the feoffor for life, remainder to the use of the feoffor's wife
for life, remainder as the wife might by deed or will appoint (general power
of appointment), or, remainder to such of his children as the wife might by
will appoint (special power of appointment). Moreover, the feoffor could
confer on the feoffee to uses power to sell, lease or mortgage the land.65 As
legal owner the feoffee could convey the legal title even though the feoffor
conferred no power of sale but in that case, as has been seen, a purchaser
from him would take subject to the use.60 If the feoffor conferred a power of
sale on the feoffee to uses, a sale by the feoffee pursuant to the power would
give the purchaser the use as well as the legal title to the land and the
cestui que use's interest would be transferred from the land to the proceeds
of sale, which the former feoffee to uses would then hold to his use.67 Thus
a feoffee to uses' power of sale was essentially a power to appoint the use.
Hence the fifteenth and sixteenth century chancery recognition of the va-
lidity of powers to appoint uses is the basis of the modem law of trustees'
powers as well as that of the modern law of powers of appointment. Both
are of great importance in the current use of the trust as an estate planning
device.
This somewhat detailed account of the origin of uses and powers has
been designed to enable the reader to judge for himself whether the creation
of uses was motivated by fraudulent purposes.68 Their creation for certain
purposes which were against public policy was restrained by statute.69 The
legislature, the executive and the judges of the common law courts all co-
65. HARGRAVE AND BUTLER, Butler's note 231, III (4) & (5) to *271b; IV
HOLDSWORTH 474-475 (1924); VII HOLDSWORTH 150-151 (1926).
66. See cases cited note 55 supra.
67. See materials cited note 65 supra.
68. See text supra at notes 11, 12. The Crown's argument that a feoffment
to the use of the feoffor's will was fraudulent because it deprived the King of his
feudal rights of wardship and marriage was decisively rejected in The King v. Lord
Dacres, Y.B. 27 Hen. 8 Pasch. pl. 22 (1535), a case argued before the Lord Chan-
cellor and all the common law judges.
69. See statutes cited note 37 supra.
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operated with the Chancellor, who was prime minister as well as being
speaker of the House of Lords and chief judge, in the creation of a remedy
for the enforcement of uses for purposes not condemned by statute and the
powers inseparably connected with them. The four main purposes were: (1)
the avoidance of ancient burdens imposed for the support of a feudal system
which had ceased to exist, (2) the avoidance of a system of inheritance
which was palpably unjust, (3) the attainment of ease and flexibility in
conveyancing not possible with primitive legal rules, and (4) the efficient
management of property of persons unable to manage their own.
The equity of the Chancellor was a means of reforming an archaic sys-
tem of law which, with changing conditions, had become both unjust and a
severe curb on the development and prosperity of the country. The other
principal means of reforming law without legislation, the legal fiction, has
also been criticized as fraudulent.1 0 Whether legislation is a better method
of reforming law than equity or legal fictions is a legitimate subject of in-
quiry,71 but a flat assertion that the desire to reform an obsolete system of
law which is no longer just is a fraudulent purpose is scarcely defensible.
The use device, as developed by the fifteenth century chancellors, in-
volved risks for innocent purchasers of land. A cestui qe use in possession
of and enjoying the rents and profits of land was actually the beneficial
owner and appeared to be the absolute owner. Yet a purchaser from him
might be ousted at common law by feoffees to uses of whose existence and
title he was unaware. This could occur without fraud on the part of the
cestui que use, who might be ignorant of transfers made by the feoffees to
uses. Nineteen months before the fatal day upon which the fall of White
Surrey72 caused the simultaneous termination of the Wars of the Roses, the
Royal House of Plantagenet and the Middle Ages, the English Parliament
attempted to remedy this evil by enacting a statute providing that a con-
veyance made by a cestui qae use should be good and effectual "against all
other having or claiming any Title or Interest in the same, only to the Use
of the same Seller, Feoffor, Donor, or Grantor, Sellers, Feoffors, Donors, or
70. J. BENTHAM, FRAGMENT ON GOVERNMENT 154-155 (1891). Cf. H. MAINE,
ANCIENT LAw 20-41 (3d Am. ed. 1879).
71. See Yntema, Equity in Civil and Common Law, 15 AMj.CoMP.L. 60, 85
(1967).
72. 22 August 1485. See SHAKEsPEARE, The Tragedy of Richard the Third:'
with the Landing of Earle Richmond, and the Battell at Bosworth Field, HISTORIES,
Actus Quintus, Scena Seczunda 201-204 (First Folio ed. 1623).
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Grantors, or his or their said heirs."1 3 This meant that a cestui que use
had statutory power to convey the legal title of the feoffees to uses as well
as his own beneficial ownership. The statute was, therefore, an important
step toward recognizing the interest of the cestui que use as legal ownership.
When feoffees to uses held to the use of A and his heirs, so that A had an
equitable fee simple, the common law courts recognized that A had power
under the statute to convey the whole legal fee simple74 or an estate of lesser
duration.7 5 When, however, the feoffees to uses held to the use of A for life
and thereafter to the use of B and his heirs, A had power under the statute
to convey only an estate for his own life"r and B had no statutory power to
convey during the life of A.77 Moreover, if the feoffees held to the use of A
and the heirs of his body, so that A had an equitable estate tail, or to the
use of A and his successors, Abbots of Croyland, so that A had an equitable
fee simple in his capacity of abbot (corporation sole), A had power under the
statute to convey only an estate for his own life.78 The statute did not give
the cestui que use the rights of a legal owner against wrongdoing third
parties 9 and it did not deprive the feoffees to uses of power to make con-
veyances which would cause trouble for purchasers from the cestui qvu use.80
The statute of Richard 11181 thus provided only a partial solution of
the problem with which it was concerned. It did nothing to solve two other
problems connected with uses which became prominent in the sixteenth
century. First, the modes of conveyance of legal estates in land known to
the common law involved a formal ceremony in the presence of witnesses,
a judicial proceeding of record in a public office, or a written instrument
under seal. Uses, however, could be created and transferred by an oral bar-
gain and sale made in private, without any of the protections against fraud
73. 1 Rich. 3, c. 1 (23 January 1483/84) (emphasis supplied). The italicized
words are a translation of the original French, "soulement al oeps." Statutes of the
Realm 11 (1816) 478. The statute was repealed by the Statute Law Revision Act,
1863, 26 & 27 Vict., c. 125.
74. Anonymous, Y.B. 9 Hen. 7, Pasch., pl. 13 (1494) (livery of seisin could be
made by attorney in fact).
75. Anonymous, Y.B. 5 Hen. 7, Mich., pl. 11 (1489) (lease for years); Anony-
mous, Y.B. 8 Hen. 7, Hil., pl. 1 (1492) (lease for years).
76. Anonymous, Y.B. 4 Hen. 7, Mich., pl. 9 (Exchequer Chamber 1488).
77. Dalamere v. Barnard, 1 Plowden 346, 75 Eng. Rep. 525 (K.B. 1567).
78. Anonymous, Y.B. 4 Hen. 7, Mich., pl. 9 (Exchequer Chamber 1488);
Anonymous, Y.B. 19 Hen. 8, Trin., pl. 11 (1527); Dalamere v. Barnard, 1 Plowden
346, 75 Eng. Rep. 525 (K.B. 1567).
79. Anonymous, 15 Hen. 7, Hil., pl. 4 (C.P. 1499), Trin., pl. 23 (1500),
Mich., pl. 1 (1500).
80. Chudleigh's Case, Dillon v. Freine, 1 Co. Rep. 120a, 132a-132b, 76 Eng.
Rep. 270, 300-301 (Q.B. 1595).
81. 1 Rich. 3, c. 1 (23 January 1483/84).
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and mistake afforded by the common law modes of conveyance.82 Second,
uses had an adverse effect on the royal revenues which was felt increasingly
as decline in the value of money caused by inflation reduced the purchasing
power of funds received by the treasury. 3 During the two centuries follow-
ing the enactment in 1290 of the statute abolishing subinfeudation,84
escheats and forfeitures of mesne seigniories resulted in most land being held
immediately of the King."5 Consequently, the loss of feudal dues avoided by
means of the use device fell mainly on the King. A medieval king was ex-
pected to "live of his own"; that is, to pay the expenses of domestic govern-
ment from his feudal land revenues;86 taxes could be levied only with the
consent of Parliament, which tended to impose them only for unusual needs,
such as foreign war.87 Moreover, both the taxes levied by Parliament and
most of the feudal dues had been fixed in money amounts in earlier centuries,
so that the purchasing power of their products was greatly reduced by in-
flation.88 The feudal dues which retained their full value, despite the drastic
decline in the value of money, were the King's rights to escheats, 9 forfei-
tures,90 primer seisin,91 wardship and marriage.92 These were precisely the
feudal dues most easily and frequently avoided by means of the use device.
King Henry VII met the fiscal needs of the Crown by procuring parlia-
mentary acts of attainder forfeiting lands held to the use of supporters of
82. Duke of Buckingham v. Stafford, Y.B. 20 Hen. 7, Mich., pl. 20 (K.B. &
C.P. 1504); Anonymous, Y.B. 27 Hen. 8, Pasch., pl. 22 (Chancery 1535).
83. W. CUNNINGHAM, THE GROWTH OF ENGLISH INDUSTRY AND COMMERCE
DURING THE EARLY AND MIDDLE AGES 488, 542-545 (5th ed. 1910).
84. Statute of Westminster III, Quia .Emptores Terrarum, 18 Edw. I, stat. 1
(1290).
85. III HoLbswoRTH 81 (3d ed. 1923).
86. IV HOLDSWORTH 446-447, 450 (2d ed. 1937). The Norman kings were able
to do this. W. CUNNINGHAM, op. cit. supra note 83, at 148.
87. II W. ANSON, LAW AND CUSTOM OF THE CONSTIrtrnON, Part II 158-161(4th ed. 1935); F. MAITLAND, CONSTTUONAL HIsToRY OF ENGLAND 96, 180, 182
(1961). Stat. 1 Rich. 3, c. 2 (1483) forbade the exaction of forced gifts.
88. The amounts of the "tenths" and "fifteenths" levied by Parliament were
fixed in 1334. W. CUNNINGHAM, op. ct. supra note 83, 548-549. The aids payable
by tenants when their lord's eldest son was knighted, his eldest daughter married
and his person required ransom and the scutage payable in lieu of furnishing knights
were fixed at low rates in 1350. F. MAITLAND, op. cit. supra note 87, at 179-180.
The relief payable when a tenant died was fixed in amount as early as 1225. See
note 16 supra. As to the fines for alienation payable by tenants in chief of the
Crown, see note 21 sispra.
89. II BLACKSTONE *72-73, *245.
90. See notes 48 and 50 uspra.
91. See note 16 supra.
92. See note 20 supra.
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his predecessors9 8 and other persons who opposed him9 4 and by employing
ruthless commissioners of escheats whose illegal exactions became notori-
ous.95 His successor determined to effect a more regular and permanent solu-
tion to the problems of uses. After prolonged negotiations between the King,
the Lords and the Commons,9 6 Parliament enacted four statutes which set-
tled the use problems in England for four centuries and still affect Angloid
law elsewhere. The Statute of Enrolments required bargains and sales of
estates in land to be in writing under seal and recorded in a public office.9 7
Two statutes permitted devise of land by written will but subjected the
devisee to the same burdens of primer seisin, relief and fine for alienation
which an heir would have borne. s The fourth enactment, which is the most
93. See, e.g., 7 Hen. 7, c. 21 (1491), Statutes of the Realm II (1816) 565,
reciting the terms of one of the acts of attainder of 1 Hen. 7 (1485). 11 Hen. 7, c.
1 (1494) put a stop to this practice for the future by providing that faithful service
to a de facto king should not be deemed to be treason or involve forfeiture.
94. E.g., 7 Hen. 7, c. 23 (1491). 4 Hen. 7, c. 17 (1488-9) subjected the minor
heirs of cestuis que use of lands held by knight service who died intestate to the
feudal burdens of wardship and marriage but this statute could be avoided by mak-
ing a will. 19 Hen. 7, c. 15 (1503-4) subjected the heirs of cestuis que use of lands
held by socage to relief but this, too, could be avoided by making a will. These
statutes and 3 Hen. 7, c. 16 (1486), which permitted suits on behalf of cestuis
que use to be conducted in the names of feoffees to uses who had been outlawed,
attainted or convicted of treason or felony, illustrate the increasing tendency to
treat the cestui que use as owner of the land.
95. IV COKE *196-98; I CoBBrr's STATE TRIALs 286 (1809); W. CUNNING-
HAM, op. cit. supra note 83, at 487; F. MAITLAND, Op. Cit. supra note 87, at 183;
Fratcher, Sovereign Immunity in Probate Proceedings, 31 Mo. L. REv. 127, 130
(1966). The illegal methods of these commissioners were prohibited by 1 Hen. 8,
c. 8 (1509).
96. IV HOLDSWORTH 449-467 (2d ed. 1937).
97. 27 Hen. 8, c. 16 (1535/36). Cf. cases cited note 82 supra. This statute did
not extend to bargains and sales of estates for years. Heyward's Case, 2 Co. Rep.
35a, 36a, 76 Eng. Rep. 489, 496 (1595). It was possible to avoid the recording re-
quirement for bargains and sales of estates for life, in fee tail and in fee simple by
making a bargain and sale of an estate for years followed by a common law deed
of release to the tenant for years. Lutwich v. Mitton, Cro. Jac. 604, 79 Eng. Rep.
516 (1621). The Statute of Enrolments was repealed by the Law of Property
Amendment Act, 1924, 15 & 16 Geo. 5, c. 5, s. 10, 12(3), sch. 10.
98. Wills Act, 32 Hen. 8, c. 1 (1540); Wills Act, 34 & 35 Hen. 8, c. 5 (1542).
Cf. authorities cited notes 19, 60 supra. The second statute explained and supple-
mented the first. These statutes permitted, in most cases, the devise of all lands
held by socage tenure but only two-thirds of lands held by knight's service, thus
preserving part of the overlord's feudal rights of wardship and marriage. See Bar-
ton, The Statute of Uses and the Trust of Freeholds, 82 L.Q.R. 215, 222-225 (1966).
The restriction on devises of land held by knight's service could be avoided by
making a feoffment to a stranger to the use of such persons as the feoffor might by
will appoint, so that the feoffor's will was an exercise of a power of appointment
rather than a devise under the statutes. Sir Edward Clere's Case, 6 Co. Rep. 17b,
77 Eng. Rep. 279 (1599); Megarry, The Statute of Uses and the Power to Devise,
7 CAmB. L.J. 354 (1941). The restriction ceased to exist when all tenures by
knight's service were converted into free and common socage. Ordinance of 24 Feb-
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important for this study, the Statute of Uses,99 "executed" uses by trans-
ferring the legal title of the feoffees to uses to the cestuis que use, each cestui
receiving a legal estate corresponding in type and duration to his use. Un-
like the statute of Richard III, the Statute of Uses operated in the same
manner when the estate in use was in fee tail or in expectancy (reversion or
remainder) and when the cestui que use was an abbot or other corporation
as when an individual held a presently possessory use in fee simple.100
Moreover, the Statute of Uses went beyond the statute of Richard III by
giving the cestui que use the full rights and burdens of a legal owner and by
depriving feoffees to uses of these rights and burdens. 1" The Statute of Uses
did not abolish uses in existence when it was enacted, prohibit the creation
of new uses, change the methods of creating uses, prevent the creation of
estates in use which could not previously have existed as legal estates, or
change the categories of persons who could be cestuis que use.102 The statute
operated in the same manner on uses in existence when it became effective
and on those created thereafter.
If determination of the scope of the Statute of Uses had been entrusted
to a non-English tribunal, hostile to the trust concept, the statute might
have been held to execute all uses. If that had occurred, there would be no
law of trust. But the interpretation of the statute was left to English judges,
products of a society whose thought, through centuries of familiarity with
uses, had become so permeated with the trust concept that it was imbedded
in the theories of corporations, partnerships, unincorporated societies, family
property and politics., 3 Such judges could not allow the statute to abolish
ruary 1645/46, Acts and Ordinances of the Interregnum I 833 (Firth & Raith, eds.
1911); Act of 27 November 1656, id. II 1043; Tenures Abolition Act, 12 Car. 2, c.
24, § 1 (1660). The Wills Acts, 1540 and 1542, were repealed and superseded by
the Wills Act, 1837, 7 Will. 4 & 1 Vict., c. 26, which requires signature by the
testator and attestation and signature by witnesses.
99. 27 Hen. 8, c. 10 (1535/36), repealed by Law of Property (Amendment)
Act, 1924, 15 & 16 Geo. 5, c. 5, § 1, sch. 1; Law of Property Act, 1925, 15 & 16
Geo. 5, c. 20, § 1 (10), 207, sch. 7.
100. Cf. authorities cited notes 73, 77, 78 supra.
101. Cf. authorities cited notes 79, 80 supra.
102. IV HOLDSWORTH 463 (2d ed. 1937); VII HoLDswoRTH 133 (1926); Pells v.
Brown, Cro. Jac. 590, 79 Eng. Rep. 504 (1620).
103. R. BORDEN, IMPERIAL RELATIONS, SELECTED SPEECHES ON THE CONSTrru-
TION II 266 (Emden, ed. 1939) (United Kingdom Government trustee for overseas
dominions); IV HoLnswoRra 476-480 (2d ed. 1937) (family law; unincorporated
societies); F. MAITLAND, op. cit. supra note 87, at 431 (King trustee of public
property), at 530 (Parliament trustee of its powers); Maitland, Introduction to 0.
GIERKE, POLITICAL THEORIES OF THE MIDDLE AGE xxvii-xxxvii (1958) (King trus-
tee of his powers for the people; corporations, partnerships and societies); Mait-
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the concept. Moreover, the process of interpretation proceeded for three
centuries and much of it occurred after the Royal Treasury had ceased to
have a substantial interest in the execution of uses.1°4 It was inevitable that
the judicial interpreters found in the statute, or read into it, a number of
exceptions of uses which it did not execute. A use which is not executed by
the Statute of Uses is a trust and the exceptions to the statute will be
discussed in the terminology of trust law. The importance of the Statute
of Uses in jurisdictions where it, or legislation like it, is in force is that one
who seeks to create a trust must come within one of the exceptions to the
statute or his creation will be executed by the statute and so may fail to
achieve his purpose.
Most mediaeval uses were passive; the only duties of the feoffees to uses
were those imposed by law: (1) to permit the cestui queu se to occupy the
land and enjoy the rents and profits; (2) to defend the title in actions at
law by and against third parties; and (3) to convey the land as directed
by the cestui que use.'15 Active trusts to provide efficient management of
property were relatively rare but they had existed from the inception of the
use device for such purposes as managing land while the beneficial owner was
absent on crusade.101 Within ten years after the enactment of the Statute
of Uses, the English courts indicated that a trust under the terms of which
the trustee had the active duties of collecting the rents and profits and
paying them over to the beneficiary was not executed by the statute 07 It
may be that this exception of active trusts was read into the Statute of Uses
because of a theory that it was applicable only to those uses embraced by
the Statute of Richard 111.108 Later English decisions indicate that a duty
imposed on the trustee by express terms of the trust to convey the land to
the beneficiary is enough to make the trust active and except it from
104. By the Tenures Abolition Act, 12 Car. 2, c. 24 (1660), the King con-
sented to the abolition of tenure by knight's service in exchange for a perpetual tax
on beer, spirits, coffee and tea. The last important case interpreting the Statute of
Uses was Doe ex dem. Lloyd v. Passingham, 6 B. & C. 305, 108 Eng. Rep. 465
(1827).
105. Bacon, op. cit. supra note 56, at 10; HARGRAVE A" BuTLER, Butler's note
77, V (11) to I COKE *191a (1812); Id., Butler's note 231 to I CoKE "271b (1812).
106. BRAcroN's NOTE BOOK, pl. 999 (1224), quoted in II POLLOCK AND MArT-
LAND 233 and in Maitland, The Origin of Uses, 8 HAxv. L. REv. 133 (1894).
107. Anonymous, Brook's New Cases 94, 73 Eng. Rep. 888 (1545). Accord:
Nevil v. Saunders, 1 Vern. 415, 23 Eng. Rep. 555 (1686).
108. Yale, The Revival of Equitable Estates in the Seventeenth Century: An
explanation by Lord Nottingham, 1957 C.L.J. 72. Cf. Durfee, The Statute of Uses
and Active Trusts, 17 MicH. L. REV. 87 (1918).
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execution by the Statute of Uses. 10 9 Terms of the trust imposing active
duties upon the trustee may not prevent partial execution by the Statute
of Uses. If land is conveyed to A and his heirs (fee simple) upon trust to
collect the rents and profits and pay them over to B during his lifetime and,
after B's death, to permit C and his heirs to take the rents and profits, C's
remainder would be executed by the statute into a legal estate, leaving A
with only a legal estate for the life of B upon trust for B.110
The English courts also excepted some passive trusts from execution
by the Statute of Uses. Because the statute was restricted to situations in
which a person stood "seized" to the use of another, it was held that it
did not execute a trust when the property held by the trustee was an estate
for years in land."' Because the statute was restricted to "lands, tenements
and hereditaments," it was held that it did not execute a trust when the
property held by the trustee was in movables, including tangible chattels
and investment securities. 112 If land was conveyed or devised to the use of
109. Mott v. Buxton, 7 Ves. Jun. 201, 32 Eng. Rep. 81 (Chancery 1802).
Doubts as to this proposition were expressed in earlier English cases. Bettuan's
Case, 4 Leonard 22, 74 Eng. Rep. 702 (K.B. 1575); Humfreston's Case, 2 Dyer
166a, n., 3 Dyer 337a, 73 Eng. Rep. 363, 760 (K.B. 1575). There are some Ameri-
can decisions to the contrary. They are collected in I A. ScoTT § 69.1. It would
seem that a trust for the sole and separate use of a married woman is active while
she remains married and that a trust to preserve contingent remainders from de-
-struction is not executed by the Statute of Uses. Ibid.; see Nevil v. Saunders,
1 Vern. 415, 23 Eng. Rep. 555 (1686); Boteler v. Allington, 1 Bro. C.C. 72, 28
Eng. Rep. 992 (1779); Thong v. Bedford, 1 Bro. C.C. 313, 28 Eng. Rep. 1154
(1783); Biscoe v. Perkins, 1 V. & B. 485, 35 Eng. Rep. 188 (Chancery 1813);
Fratcher, op. cit. supra note 62, at 913 n.
110. Shapland v. Smith, 1 Bro. C.C. 75, 28 Eng. Rep. 94 (Chancery 1780);
:Silvester ex dem. Law v. Wilson, 2 Term Rep. 444, 100 Eng. Rep. 239 (K.B. 1788).
Conversely, it would seem that if land is conveyed to A and his heirs (present fee
simple) upon trust to permit B to take the rents and profits during his lifetime
and, after B's death, to collect the rents and profits and pay them over to C and
his heirs, the life interest of B would be executed by the statute into a legal estate,
leaving A with only a legal future estate to commence in possession upon the death
of B. HARGRAVE AND BUTLER, Butler's note 249, VI, to COKE I "290b.
111. Anonymous, 3 Dyer 369a, 73 Eng. Rep. 827 (Exch. Ch. 1580); Symson v.
Turner, 1 Eq. Cas. Abr. 383, 21 Eng. Rep. 1119 (1700). That is to say, one could
be "seized" within the meaning of the statute only of an estate for life or in fee
by free tenure. As copyhold tenure was simply the old villein tenure, which was
unfree, the statute did not execute a trust of a copyhold estate. HARGRAVE AND
BUTLER, Note 231, III (5) to COKE I *271b; see Rowden v. Maltster, Cro. Car. 42,
44, 79 Eng. Rep. 641, 642 (1620).
112. F. BAcON, Reading on the Statute of Uses, III Woaxs 307 (1844). See
Lyte v. Peny, 1 Dyer 49a, 73 Eng. Rep. 108 (K.B. 1542); Anderson v. Dawson, 15
Ves. Jun. 532, 33 Eng. Rep. 856 (Chancery 1808); Bill v. Cureton, 2 My. & K. 503,
39 Eng. Rep. 1036 (Chancery 1835); Hansen v. Miller, 14 Sim. 22, 60 Eng. Rep.
264 (Chancery 1844). "Hereditaments" were property interests which passed at
death to the heir. Estates for years in land and interests in movables passed at
death to the executor or administrator.
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A and his heirs upon trust for B and his heirs (use on a use) the statute
executed the use of A into a legal estate but did not affect the trust for B;
consequently A held the legal title upon passive trust for B."13 If the owner
of land, without conveying to another and without consideration, declared
himself trustee for a beneficiary not related to him by blood or marriage,
the trust was not executed by the statute, even though passive.114 There
is some authority for the proposition that when a trust is created by will,
execution by the Statute of Uses can be prevented by an express manifesta-
tion of intention. 1 5 Resulting trusts,"16 which arise by implication of law,
and constructive trusts,"17 which are imposed by judicial fiat to remedy
unjust enrichment, are excepted from execution by the Statute of Uses.
The Statute of Uses or similar legislation is in force in Ireland," 8
Liberia"19 and the parts of the British Commonwealth which have Angloid
law.120 These jurisdictions tend to follow the English decisions as to its
113. Tyrrell's Case, 2 Dyer 115a, 73 Eng. Rep. 336 (Court of Wards 1557);
Sambach v. Dalston, Tothill 188, 21 Eng. Rep. 164 (Chancery 1634); Doe ex dem.
Lloyd v. Passingham, 6 B. & C. 305, 108 Eng. Rep. 465 (1827); see Hopkins v.
Hopkins, 1 Atk. 581, 591, 26 Eng. Rep. 365, 371-372 (Chancery 1738). As a bargain
and sale deed raises a use in the bargainee (grantee), any trust imposed upon him
for the benefit of another is a use on a use which is not executed by the Statute
of Uses. The reason for this exception advanced by some writers is that, prior to
the statute, a use on a use was deemed to be void for repugnancy. BLACKSTONE II
*336; Ames, Origin of Uses and Trusts 21 HAW. L. REv. 261, 270-274 (1908).
Another view is that this exception, like that of active trusts, is due to a theory
that the Statute of Uses applied only to those uses embraced by the Statute of
Richard III. Yale, op. cit. supra note 108. Cf. Strathdene, Sambacht v. Dalstow An
Unnoticed Report, 74 L.Q.R. 550 (1958); Barton, Tke Statuate of Uses and the
Trust of Freeholds, 82 L.Q.R. 215 (1966).
114. Cf. Steele v. Wallar, 28 Beav. 466, 54 Eng. Rep. 445 (1860). This case
involved a trust of copyhold land, which would not have been executed by the
statute in any event (supra note 111), but this result is necessary even as to free-
hold land because a use could not be raised in this manner before the statute.
Warde v. Tuddingham, 2 Rolle Abr. 783 pl. 5 (1605).
115. Burchett v. Durdant, 2 Vent. 311, 86 Eng. Rep. 458 (Exch. 1690); Baker
v. White, L.R. 20 Eq. 166 (1875); In re Tanqueray-Willaume and Landau, 20
Ch.D. 475, 478 (1882); In re Brooke, [1894] 1 Ch. 43. Contra, Broughton v. Lang-
ley, 2 Salk. 679, 91 Eng. Rep. 577 (K.B. 1703). The theory for making an exception
here is that the Wills Act, 1540, having been enacted after the Statute of Uses,
modified it.
116. Doe ex dem. Shelley v. Edlin, 4 Ad. & E. 582, 111 Eng. Rep. 906 (K.B.
1836).
117. See I A. ScoTr § 73.1. This is because the trustee of a constructive trust
has an active duty to convey to the beneficiary.
118. The Statute of Uses (Ireland), 1634, 10 Car. 2, Sess. 2, c. 1, Statutes Re-
vised (Northern Ireland) I (1956) 20.
119. See LIBERIAN CODE (1956) tit. 6 § 91, 1160, 1192, tit. 5 § 508(6); Liberian
Law Reports II (1960) ix.
120. Spencer v. Registrar of Titles, [1906] A.C. 503 (Privy Council on appeal
from Western Australia); Conveyancing Act § 44(2), Conveyancing and Law
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effect, including those establishing exceptions from its operation. 12' The
Statute of Uses or similar legislation is in force in most of the United States
of America. 2 2 American courts tend to follow the English view that active
trusts are excepted from execution by the statute123 but some do not consider
an expressly imposed duty to convey to or at the direction of the beneficiary
sufficient to make a trust active.124 New York and several other states have
statutes providing that every trust under which the beneficiary is entitled to
possession and the rents and profits is executed, even though the trustee
has active duties. 12 1 The New York Statute has been held to extend to
trusts of chattels and investment securities as well as those of land. 2 6
Early American judicial opinions gave lip service to the English deci-
sions excepting some types of passive trusts from execution by the Statute
of Uses. 127 In modern American law, however, these have been largely super-
seded by a doctrine that a trustee's legal estate does not extend beyond the
period during which he has active duties to perform, despite the settlor's
use of language which would be sufficient to convey a fee simple to a grantee
who was not a trustee. 28 In theory, this doctrine differs from the Statute
of Property Act, 1898 § 33, New South Wales Stat. 1824-1957 II 780, 918; Smith
v. Dawes, 1 Legge 802 (New South Wales Sup. Ct. 1854); Gamble v. Rees, 6 Q.B.
396 (Upper Canada 1850); In the Will of Blake, O'Neil v. Hart, 11 Argus L. Rep.
133 (Victoria 1904). Berry v. Berry, 16 Nova Scotia Rep. 66 (1882) has been
cited as holding that the Statute of Uses is not in force in Nova Scotia, but it did
not do so. The obiter dictum of one of the judges (p. 78) that "It has never been
held that the Statute of Uses and Enrolments are in force in this Province," was
made in the context of an argument which was relevant only to the Statute of
Enrolments.
121. Cases cited note 120 supra; Fair v. McCrow, 31 Q.B. 599 (Upper Canada
1871); Re Young, 9 Ontario Practice Rep. 521 (1883). See Roberts v. Howard, 2
Liberian L. Rep. 226 (1916). But see Re Bingham and Wrigglesworth, 5 Ontario
Rep. 611 (1884) (duty to convey to beneficiary insufficient to prevent execution by
statute); Re Bayliss and Balfe, 38 O.L.R. 437 (1917) (trust for sole and separate
use of married woman executed by statute).
122. Annot., 16 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1148 (1908); J. PERRY, I TREATIsE ON THE
LAw OF TRUSTS AND TRusTErs 525n (7th ed. 1929). E.g., § 456.020, RSMo 1959.
123. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TRUSTS § 69; the cases are collected in I A.
ScoTT § 69.1.
124. Cornwell v. Orton, 126 Mo. 355, 27 S.W. 536 (1894). Other cases are
collected in I A. ScoTr § 69.1. Cf. notes 109, 121 supra.
125. N.Y. Estates, Powers and Trusts Law §§ 7-1.1, 7-1.2. Similar legislation
in sixteen states is collected in I A. SCOTT § 68.1 n. 3. See also Rarick, The Trustee's
Estate and the Ultimate Interest 11b 8 OKLA. L. Rnv. 133 (1955).
126. Reed v. Browne, 295 N.Y. 184, 66 N.E.2d 47 (1946).
127. They are collected in I A. ScoTT H§ 68, 70-72, and discussed in Rarick,
The Trustee's Estate and the Ultimate Interest 1, 8 OKLA. L. REv. 1, 12-24 (1955).
E.g., Guest v. Farley, 19 Mo. 147 (1853) (use on a use). But see Blumenthal v.
Blumenthal, 251 Mo. 693, 703, 158 S.W. 648, 651 (1913).
128. I A. ScoTr § 88; Rarick, op. cit. supra note 127, 24-58. See Miller v.
Kriner, 247 S.W.2d 757 (Mo. 1952). Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 88,
comment a (1959) (doctrine not applied to defeat manifested intention of settlor).
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of Uses as to time of operation. If land is conveyed to A and his heirs upon
trust for B during his life and thereafter for C and his heirs, with active
duties during the life of B but not thereafter, the Statute of Uses, if applica-
ble, converts the fee simple of A into an estate pur autre vie at the time of
the creation of the trust.129 If the Statute of Uses is inapplicable, it would
seem that the American doctrine permits A to retain the fee simple, with the
powers of an owner in fee simple, during B's lifetime, but terminates his
estate on the death of B, as if A himself had died at the same time leaving C
as his sole heir. As so applied, the doctrine merely eliminates the necessity
of a conveyance from the trustee to the remainderman. If, however, by
confusion with the rules under the Statute of Uses or otherwise, the doctrine
is held to operate at the time of the creation of the trust, its application can
have serious consequences, particularly in those states where a duty to con-
vey to the beneficiary is not deemed to be an active duty even though ex-
pressly imposed by the terms of the trust. For example, if land is conveyed or
devised to A and his heirs "in fee simple absolute," upon trust to take pos-
session, keep the premises in repair, pay taxes, collect the rents and profits,
and pay them over to B so long as B shall live and, upon the death of B,
to convey to the descendants of B then in being, the trustee may take only
an estate for the life of B, and the descendants of B a legal contingent re-
mainder. If this is so, unless A has powers of conveyance independent of
ownership, a conveyance or lease by A would give the purchaser or lessee
only an estate which will expire on the death of B.30 The practical effect
is to make the fee simple inalienable during the life of B.
Some American courts have extended the doctrine to trusts of chattels
and securities.181 When this is given the effect of making transfers of the
129. HARGRAVE AND BuTrLER, Butler's Note 231, III (1), to COKE I 271b; RE-
STATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TRUSTS § 69, comment b (1959). Cf. id., comment d;
W. SHE PAR, GRAND ABRIDGMENT Pt. IV 172-174 (1675).
130. Rarick, The Trustee's Estate and the Ultimate Interest III, 8 OKLA. L.
REV. 265, 267-272 (1955). The reduced duration of the trustee's estate may have
other troublesome consequences. Adverse possession against the trustee may not
bar the remaindermen. Id. at 272-276. Cf. Benson v. Fekete, 424 S.W.2d 729 (Mo.
1968). The trustee may not represent the remaindermen in litigation. Rarick,
supra at 285-293. The trustee may be unable to insure buildings for their full
value. Rarick, supra at 325.
If the terms of the trust expressly empower the trustee to sell the fee, he is
usually held to have a fee simple. Rarick, op. cit. supra note 127, at 35. E.g., Ewing
v. Shannahan, 113 Mo. 188, 20 S.W. 1065 (1892). This is curious bcause such a
trustee does not need the normal powers of an owner in fee to convey the fee;
it is the trustee without express power of sale who needs them.
131. Dixon v. Dixon, 123 Me. 470, 124 Atl. 198 (1924); Bellows v. Page, 88
N.H. 283, 188 Ad. 12 (1936); In re Lowitz' Estate, 360 Pa. 91, 61 A.2d 342
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trust property impossible for an extended period, the result is most undesira-
ble. The intention of the settlor to provide for efficient management of the
trust property is thwarted for no reason at all, since the original purpose of
the Statute of Uses, to protect the feudal revenues of King Henry VIII, no
longer exists. Perhaps the worst feature of this strange doc rne is its effect
in making it uncertain whether any trustee has the whole legal title to trust
property or only an estate of limited duration. Such uncertainty discourages
vigorous, efficient management by the trustee, and deters third persons from
dealing with him to the detriment of the very persons whom the settlor
intended to benefit.
It will be recalled that, under the common law, remainders limited to
unborn persons were subject to destruction by the holder of the preceding
life estate for his own benefit. 13 2 The common law doctrine of destructibility
of contingent remainders was extended to remainders in use executed by the
Statute of Uses. 3 3 To prevent the operation of this doctrine, seventeenth
century conveyancers invented the trust to preserve contingent re-
mainders. 3 4 The life tenant could not destroy contingent remainders with-
out the cooperation of the trustees.135 Although the trustees had legal power
to destroy the remainders, the High Court of Chancery would compel any-
one who took title from them with knowledge of the trust, or without paying
(1948). Smith, The Statutte of Uses: A Look at its Historical Evoluxtion and De-
mse, 18 WEST. REs. L. REV. 40, 58 (1966). Additional cases are collected in I A.
ScoTr § 70, n. 2, 3; § 88.1, nn. 3, 4. Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 88(2) and comment f (1959) (trustee of personal property takes interest of unlimited
duration unless different intention manifested).
132. See cases cited note 28 supra.
133. Chudleigh's Case, 1 Co. Rep. 120a, 76 Eng. Rep. 270 (1595); Archer's
Case 1 Co. Rep. 66b (1597); Smith v. Belay, Cro. Eliz. 630, 78 Eng. Rep. 870
(159').
134. Garth v. Cotton, 3 Atk. 752, 753-55, 26 Eng. Rep. 1231, 1232-33 (Chan-
cery 1753); II BLACKSTONE *172; VII HOLDSWORTE 112 (1926); F. POLLOcK, THE
LAND LAWS 223-225 (1896); Fratcher, Trustor as Sole Trustee and Only Ascertain-
able Beneficiary, 47 MlcH. L. REV. 907, 913-915 (1949).
135. Penhay v. Hurrell, 2 Vern. 370, 23 Eng. Rep. 834 (1702); Hopkins v.
Hopkins, 1 Atk. 581, 26 Eng. Rep. 365 (1738); Parkhurst v. Smith ex dem.
Dormer, 6 Brown 351, 2 Eng. Rep. 1127 (1740); Garth v. Cotton, 3 Atk. 752, 26
Eng. Rep. 1231 (1753); Atty.-Gen. ex rel. Univ. of Cambridge v. Lady Downing,
Wilm. 1, 97 Eng. Rep. 1 (1767); Astley v. Micklethwait, L.R. 15 Ch.D. 59 (1880).
See Cole v. Moore, Moore K.B. 806, 72 Eng. Rep. 917 (1607); Symance v. Tattam,
1 Atk. 613, 26 Eng. Rep. 385 (1737). An equitable tenant in tail could, however,
bar equitable remainders following the estate tail, whether vested or contingent, by
suffering a common recovery. Brydges v. Brydges, 3 Ves. Jun 120, 30 Eng. Rep.
926 (1796). This seems to have been the rule as to uses before the Statute of
Uses. Anonymous, Brooks New Cases 91, 73 Eng. Rep. 887 (1483). This is why
it was possible to resettle estates when a tenant in tail in remainder came of age.
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a valuable consideration, to recreate the remainders. 3 6 If the trustees con-
veyed to a purchaser who paid value without notice of the trust, the pur-
chaser took free of the trust but the High Court of Chancery would compel
the trustees to buy lands of equal value and convey them to the wronged
contingent remainderman.' 3 7 It became customary in English landed families
to settle lands so that living persons held only life estates, with remainders
in fee tail, protected by trusts, to their unborn sons. When a remainderman
in tail came of age, he was expected to join the current life tenant in effecting
a resettlement, after which he would have only an estate for life, with remain-
der in fee tail to his unborn sons, protected by a trust.188
The custom of settlement and resettlement of land by means of the
trust device had serious economic disadvantages, both to the families which
followed it and to the country at large. Unless the terms of the trust em-
powered the trustees to convey and mortgage the fee simple and give long
leases, no one could do so. The life tenant in possession could neither raise
funds to finance repairs and improvements by mortgage or lease nor sell the
land to purchasers who had the means needed to improve it. Hence buildings
tended to fall into disrepair and land could not be utilized to its maximum
potential. 39 In 1882140 Parliament began a legislative reform of the law of
trusts which was not completed until 1925. Under statutes enacted in the
latter year, the only permitted legal estates in land are the fee simple ab-
solute in possession and the term of years absolute. Life interests, entailed
interests, interests of infants (persons under twenty-one years of age), un-
divided shares, powers of appointni-it and all future interests are permitted
only as beneficial interests under trusts.'14 Trustees of land have statutory
powers, which cannot be cut down by the terms-of the trust, to convey,
mortgage and lease the land free of the trust.142 The Statute of Uses was
repealed. 143 Under this legislation, land cannot be made inalienable by means
136. Pye v. Gorge, 1 P. Wms. 128, 24 Eng. Rep. 323 (1710), aff'd sub. nom;
Gorges v. Pye, 7 Brown 221, 3 Eng. Rep. 144 (1712); see Else v. Osborn, 1 P.
Wms. 387, 24 Eng. Rep. 437 (1717).
137. Mansell v. Mansell, 2 P. Wms. 678, 24 Eng. Rep. 913 (1732); see Tipping
v. Piggot, 1 Eq. Cas. Abr. 385, 21 Eng. Rep. 1120 (1711).
138. Spring, The Settlement of Land in Nineteenth-Century England, 8 AM.
J. LEGAL HIST. 209 (1964).
139. T. ScurroN, LAND IN Fnrrsxs (1886).
140. Settled Land Act, 1882, 45 & 46 Vict. c. 38.
141. Law of Property Act, 1925, 15 & 16 Geo. 5, c. 20, § 1.
142. Settled Land Act, 1925, 15 & 16 Geo. 5, c. 18, § 38, 41, 71, 106; Trustee
Act, 1925, 15 & 16 Geo. 5, c. 19, § 16; Law of Property Act, 1925, 15 & 16 Geo. 5,
c. 20, § 28.
143. Law of Property (Amendment) Act, 1924, 15 Geo. 5, c. 5, § 1, sch. 1; Law
of Property Act, 1925, 15 to 16 Geo. 5, c. 20, § 1, 207, sch. 7. See Bordwell,
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of trusts or future interests; the means of improving it and applying it to
the most advantageous purposes are always available. The interests of all
beneficiaries of trusts are interests in a potentially changing fund rather than
in specific land.
In a sense, the repeal of the Statute of Uses was illusory because the
extensive powers conferred on all trustees of land by the 1925 legislation
make all trusts of land active, so that they would not be executed by the
Statute of Uses in any event.144 Nevertheless, the repeal of the Statute of
Uses has a very important effect of restoring certainty to the law of trusts.
In England and Wales settlors of trusts, trustees, and persons who deal with
trustees need fear no longer that the Statute of Uses has executed the legal
estate out of the trustees, wholly or partially, thus nullifying conveyances,
leases and other acts done by the trustees.145 When, in 1402, the House of
Commons petitioned for effective enforcement of the rights of cestuis que use,
it recognized that trusts serve valuable purposes.146 The High Court of
Chancery responded magnificently, but for four hundred years after 1535
the Statute of Uses interposed a troublesome barrier to the creation of
trusts and a constant threat of destroying them by execution. Parliament
acted wisely in repealing the statute in England and Wales. Other jurisdic-
tions oppressed by the uncertainties produced by the Statute of Uses could
well do likewise.
American states which have extended the principle of the Statute of
Uses to trusts of chattels and trusts under which the trustee has a duty to
convey to the beneficiary,147 directly or by means of the doctrine that the
trustee's legal estate cannot extend beyond the period during which he has
active duties, 48 need more than mere repeal of the Statute of Uses. They
need legislation to ensure that a settlor's intent that the trustee shall have
the fee simple in land and the whole legal title to chattels is not thwarted
by judicial extension of a policy adopted to protect the feudal revenues of
King Henry VIII. Henry VIII is dead. Uses have uses.
The Repeal of the Statute of Uses, 39 HAuv. L. Rxv. 466 (1926); Smith, op. cit.
supra note 131, at 62-63.
144. See text accompanying notes 107 and 109 supra.
145. Cases cited notes 110, 115, 121 supra.
146. See note 55 supra.
147. Cases cited notes 121, 124-126, 131 supra.
148. See text accompanying notes 128-130 supra.
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